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It is the objective of this 
essay to analyse the 
relationship between 
income distribution and 
growth.  
 
In the first section, the 
central arguments of the 
more influential 
economic growth 
theories will be 
discussed.  Next, the 
historical discussion 
involving the relationship 
between income 
distribution and 
economic growth will be 
outlined. Further to this I 
will examine the basic 
characteristics of models 
linking inequality and 
growth.  Finally, the 
more recent literature 
regarding income 
distribution, social 
instability and economic 





There has been much study relating to the explanation of economic 
inequality and its relationship with economic growth since Kuznets’ (1955) 
pioneering work.  This work has motivated several researches to evaluate 
whether a reduction in income inequality improves economic performance.  
 
Inequality as an economic problem has significant effects upon political 
and social sectors in the modern society. Insights from studying economic 
inequality are mainly obtained from researching the structure of income 
distribution and its effect on economic growth and social stability.  
 
It is the objective of this essay to analyse the relationship between income 
distribution and growth.  In the first section, the central arguments of the 
more influential economic growth theories will be discussed.  Next, the 
historical discussion involving the relationship between income distribution 
and economic growth will be outlined. Further to this I will examine the 
basic characteristics of models linking inequality and growth. Finally, the 
more recent literature regarding income distribution, social instability and 
economic growth will be addressed. 
 
Economic Growth Theory: A Briefly Review 
 
Theoretical works in the economic growth area have been sustained on the 
Neoclassical Model developed by Solow (1956).  In this model, the 
possibility of economic growth in the product per capita, in the steady 
state, depends on the exogenous variable; Total Factor Productivity. 
According to the classical model, there exists an inverse relationship 
between the level of product per capita in the beginning of a certain period, 
and the rate of growth of the same variable in the previous period.  
However, empirical studies could not show this negative relationship.  
 
A “new theory of growth” emerged analogous to the classical model. This 
new theory assesses the conclusions of the classical framework resembling 
international convergence of the per-capita income and the effects of the 
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saving rate over the growth of output in the long 
run.  Former studies developed by Paul Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) criticized the 
functionality of the neoclassical model applied to 
the analysis of economic growth.  In 1986, Paul 
Romer postulated the existence of externalities in 
the process of accumulation of technology and 
knowledge. The hypothesis of his model was 
motivated by the experience of the “Asiatic 
tigers” countries. These countries exhibited a 
strong growth in their exports combined with a 
large degree of openness in their economy. 
 
In their influential work Barro and Xala-i-Martin 
(1992) proposed the conditional convergence 
theory. Their results demonstrated favorable 
evidence of the hypothesis of convergence but 
conditional, due to the influence of the public 
policies on growth. In this context, the 
differences in the quality of economic policy 
strategies affect the process of development of 
the total productivity factor and hence the 
economic growth rate. 
 
There exists another factor that tends to have a 
direct effect upon the economic growth rate. The 
model of technological diffusion developed by 
Lucas (2000) represents an additional and 
complementary approach to the economic 
growth theories. Lucas argues that via “learning 
by doing” process that goes from “leaders” 
economies to “followers” economies the 
technological diffusion is given. This knowledge 
acquired in the less developed economies can be 
used on its production function, resulting in a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
 
Two main conclusions can be obtained from the 
economic literature of economic growth1: 
 
1)        Economic growth is mostly determined 
by the following factors; accumulation of capital, 
human capital, and knowledge usable in 
production.  
2)        The initial levels of capital, human capital 
and knowledge will determine the actual and 
subsequent economic growth.  
 
However, countries almost in the initial period 
are endowed with different land size and 
dissimilar proportions of capital and human 
capital. These differences have an impact on the 
distribution of wealth.  Consequently, countries 
present different patterns of wealth distributions.  
 
As long as have been identified the main factors 
that affect almost directly economic growth the 
following question rising:  What is the 
relationship between income distribution and 
economic growth?  The next section will answer 
this question by exploring the historical 
discussion of the relationship between income 
distribution and economic growth. 
 
Historical discussion of the relationship on 
Income Distribution and Economic Growth 
 
Since the beginning of 1950’s there have been 
two approaches in trying to explain how income 
distribution affects economic performance. On 
the one hand, Kaldor (1956) argued that the 
causal effect goes from income distribution on 
capital accumulation to economic growth. 
Greater inequality with regard to the distribution 
of income favors greater capital accumulation. 
This is due to rich people being able to save more 
of their income than the poor people. 
Consequently, Kaldor argues that the higher the 
share of the top quintile (i.e. the more unequal is 
the distribution of income), then the higher the 
investment.  
 
On the other hand, the research paper developed 
by Kuznets in 1955 focused its analysis mainly on 
the opposite causal link, from growth to income. 
Kuznets found that there is an inverted-U 
relation between level of income and measures of 
inequality in cross-section regressions. In 
particular, Kuznets developed the so called U-
inverted curve, which must be linked to the 
hypothesis that income inequality first increases 
and then decreases with development. The 
Kuznets’ curve remains a controversial concept 
both theoretically and empirically. His work deals 
with the question of how the level of income 
affects income distribution. (Persson and 
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Tabellini, 1994) 
 
The majority of the subsequent studies on this 
hypothesis have found that income inequality has 
a negative relationship with economic growth. 
Clarke (1993), for example, utilizes different 
measures of income inequality2 in order to test 
the correlation with some determinants of 
economic growth.  In short, he uses the Barro 
regressors as determinants of the long run.  Table 
1 shows the simple correlations of inequality 
variables with the Barro regressors carried out by 
Clarke. 
 
Inequality is significantly correlated with growth 
of per-capita GDP (LGDP7088), per capita GDP 
(SGDPPC70) and enrollment rates in secondary 
education (CSEC60), and a lesser extent primary 
education (CPRIM60). Private consumption 
(SCONIY) and investment (SINVIY) measured, 
for each country, in the same year, as the 
inequality measures are both insignificantly 
correlated with inequality. According to Clarke, 
the results obtained from the ‘Barro-type’ 
regression are robust across different inequality 
measures. His main conclusion states that 
inequality is negatively, and robustly, correlated 
with growth.  
 
Nonetheless, in the real world where capital and 
income is inequality distributed across countries, 
the existence of the local governments play an 
essential and positive role in promoting 
economic growth. According to the endogenous 
theory of economy growth, the specific 
redistributive policies implemented by 
governments potentially have an effect upon the 
performance economy.   
 
From the review of endogenous theory, there are 
models which emphasized links between income 
distribution and growth that operate through 
nonpolitical channels3. According to Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) the industrialization in 
one sector can increase spending in other 
manufacturing sectors by altering the 
composition of demand.  Hence, even if a firm is 
losing money, it can benefit firms in other sectors 
because it raises labor income and hence demand 
for their products. This is particularly true when 
considering the contribution of the 
industrialization of one sector, which can enlarge 
the size of the market in other sectors. Due to 
the income distribution influences, the size of 
home demand also affects the potential 
industrialization. Shleifer and Vishny’s theoretical 
work emphasizes the importance of demand 
spillovers between sectors as they are strong to 
generate a big push in other sectors. In short, 
income distribution determines the size of home 
demand; this determines the industrialization in 
one sector and therefore the possibility of 
generating a big push. Hence, according to this 
model, the big push of one sector of the 
economy can generate a positive effect on 
economic growth.  
 
Moreover, income inequality can affect the 
economic growth through human capital 
channels. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that in 
models with liquidity constraints, income 
distribution determines the share of the 
population that can invest in education. This 
means that the relationship between inequality 
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Variable No. Obs. Corr. w/GINI T stat No. Obs Corr. w/RTP40 T stat 
LGDPC7088 70 -0.199 -1.79 87 -0.162 -1.53 
SGDPPC70 75 -0.031 -0.26 83 -0.035 -0.31 
CPRIM60 82 -0.166 -1.51 89 -0.095 -0.89 
CSEC60 82 -0.373 -3.59 89 -0.317 -3.11 
SCONIY  72 0.83 0.69 77 0.024 0.21 
SINVIY 72 -0.12 -1.01 77 -0.039 -0.34 
Source: Data from Clarke (1993) 
TABLE 1. SIMPLE CORRELATIONS WITH BARRO REGRESSORS AND OTHER VARIABLES 
and growth is positive at lows levels of income, 
but negative otherwise. In other words, in an 
economy with non-perfect capital markets, those 
individuals whose after income tax below the 
cost of acquiring education will be unable to 
invest in human capital. Therefore in the next 
period they will earn the same pre-tax income. By 
contrast, those who can afford the expenditure in 
education will obtain will a higher income4. 
Consequently, individuals at high levels of 
income can afford education, which in turn 
positively affects the economic growth. 
Otherwise the relationship between inequality 
and growth is negative.   The implication of the 
above two models is: endogenizing income 
inequality can influence the economic 
performance.  
 
However, the literature on endogenous policy has 
made clear the importance of policy for growth - 
but it has not yet made the link between policy 
and growth (Persson and Tabellini 1994, p.601). 
As a result of this theoretical limitation, models 
with political equilibrium linking income 
distribution and economic growth emerged. In 
these models, the level of taxation is mainly used 
for redistributive purposes. Among the literature 
reviewed, two complementary approaches that 
have to be with the way of endogeneize the 
redistributive policies can be identified5. 
 
Political economics models 
 
The first approach is based on the effects of 
inequality on the demand for fiscal redistribution. 
According to Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1991), income inequality is 
harmful for growth due to the fact that in more 
unequal societies, the demand for fiscal 
distribution financed by distorsionary taxation is 
higher, causing a lower rate of growth. In both 
research papers the main idea is that a higher rate 
reduces the private after-tax marginal product of 
capital and therefore acts as a disincentive to 
investment and growth.  
 
 In a complementary work, Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) build a theoretical political-equilibrium 
model in which political decisions produce 
economic policies that tax investment and 
growth, promoting activities in order to 
redistribute income. The main conclusion 
obtained from his work is that income inequality 
is harmful for growth, because it leads to policies 
that do not protect property rights and do not 
allow full private appropriation of returns from 
investment. 
 
The second approach is to endogenize the level 
of taxation through a voting process.  The central 
argument consists that income inequality and the 
tax rate resulting from the voting process, are 
positively related through an extension of the 
standard median voter result. The median voter 
theorem establishes that the tax selected by the 
government is the one preferred by the median 
voter. According to this theorem, the more 
equitable the distribution in the economy, the 
better endowed is the median voter with capital. 
Consequently, if the level of taxation is low, 
higher is the economy’s growth. (Alesina and 
Rodrik 1994, p. 466) 
 
Following this line of research, Perotti (1993) 
developed a voting model inequality in which 
different patterns of income distribution are 
conductive to a high growth at different levels. 
He argues that when preferences are aggregated 
via a voting process, the initial pattern of income 
distribution plays a crucial role in the evolution of 
the economy. This is because it determines the 
degree of redistribution that prevails in the 
political equilibrium. In particular, if the economy 
has a poor median voter relative to the average 
voter, then the level of taxation and 
redistribution tends to be positively associated. 
Hence, as higher is the proportion of poor 
median voter relative to the average voter as 
higher is the level of taxation and redistribution 
in the economy. This level of taxation and 
redistribution negatively affects investment and 
thus economic growth. 
 
To sum up, income distribution and economic 
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growth show a negative relationship. As has been 
mentioned, income inequality affects the level of 
industrialization and the level of education in the 
economy; consequently income redistributive 
policies have a direct effect on economic growth. 
Also, it was emphasized that endogenizing the 
redistributive policies could have an influence 
upon economic performance. Because 
governments face redistributive demands as a 
consequence of income inequality, this can 
deviate resources from investment and thus 
negatively affect economic growth.  
 
Models of social instability and political 
regimes 
 
Several research papers have recently exposed 
different channels through income inequality that 
can affect growth. Alessina and Perotti (1993) 
identify a channel for an inverse relationship 
between income inequality and growth. As a 
consequence of income inequality, socio-political 
instability increases, which in turn fuels social 
discontent. As a result of this, the socio-political 
instability reduces investment. As argued in the 
past section, income inequality and investment 
are inversely related. Since investment is a 
primary engine of growth, income inequality 
reduces growth. Also, they emphasize that the 
greater the inequality within a society, the more 
politically unstable it is.  In particular, political 
stability is enhanced by the presence of a wealthy 
middle class. Finally, Alessina and Perotti found a 
high correlation between secondary school 
enrollment and the proportion of the middle 
class. This suggests an additional channel through 
which income inequality may enhance growth 
and accumulation - a wealthy middle class can 
afford to invest in higher education, while an 
impoverished one cannot. Also, the later finding 
seems to confirm the evidence of Galor and 
Zeira (1993); that income inequality can affect the 
economic growth through human capital 
channels.  
 
In his influential work, Perotti (1994) investigated 
the relationship between income distribution, 
democratic institutions and growth. He found the 
specific channels through which income 
distribution affects growth.  In his own words, he 
concludes that: ‘More equal societies have lower 
fertility rates and higher rates of investment in 
education. Both are reflected in higher rates of 
growth. Also, very unequal societies tend to be 
politically and socially unstable, which is reflected 
in lower rates of investment and therefore 
growth….’ Perotti (1996, p. 182) 
 
As was discussed, governments have to consider 
income distribution demands’ in order to 
maintain politic stability and thus promote 
investment and economic growth. It follows that 
the political regime plays an important role in 
moderating these political pressures. At this point 
it is essential to analyze the effects of income 
inequality on the degree of redistribution 
implemented in different political regimes.  
 
According to Boix (1994) the redistributive 
consequences of each political regime are 
logically at odds with each other. For example, in 
democracies the public sector steadily, pushed by 
both redistributive demands and pressures to 
reduce the volatility of business cycle and 
economic risks. In turn, in revolutionary regimes, 
the nationalization of private assets leads first to 
the introduction of central planning and 
socialism, and then, devoid of transparent 
mechanisms of political accountability, very often 
to widespread corruption and economic 
stagnation.  
 
The redistributive consequences of each political 
regime have been subject to a significant number 
of studies. On the one hand, some authors argue 
that democratic regimes generate an explosion 
for current consumption. The chain of reasoning 
for this is as follows: (1) Poor people want to 
consume immediately. (2.1) When workers can 
organize, they drive wages up, reduce profits, and 
reduce investment (either they tax and transfer or 
they undertake less public investment). (2.2.) 
When people can vote, governments distribute 
income away from investment (either they tax 
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and transfer or they undertake less public 
investment). (3) Finally, lowering investments 
slows down growth. (Przeworski and Limongi 
1993, p. 55).  Then, democracy is thus 
unfavorable to development. According to this 
point of view, dictatorships are therefore better 
able to force savings and launch economic 
growth. In other words, a superior economic 
performance is possible under an authoritarian 
political regime. Examples of successful 
economic development under authoritarian 
political regime are the Asian ‘tigers’ countries. 
They achieved higher economic growth in the 
90’s in comparison to the Latin American 
countries in the same period6.  
 
On the other hand, the positive aspect of 
democratic governments is that they provide law 
and order, enforcing contracts as well as 
defending private parties from external threats. 
Additionally governments provide those inputs to 
private production that are not efficiently 
supplied by the market. As articulated by Lipset, 
the process of economic development results in 
both a reduction in the level of income inequality, 
which is a source of political conflict and fosters 
the adoption of authoritarian solutions, and the 
growth of a broad middle class, who then acts as 
a moderating political source. Lipset (1959, p.83-
84). Hence, democratic regimes propitiate a 
climate of political stability. Rodrik (1997) argues 
that whatever the long run growth level of an 
economy, there is less instability in economic 
outcomes under a democratic regime than there 
would be under an authoritarian regime.  The 
presence of civil liberties and political rights 
under democracies improve an economy’s 
capacity to adjust to change in the external 
environment.  Also in Rodrik another mechanism 
through which volatility may be dampened by 
democracy is proposed: democratic societies are 
more likely to respond to economic shock 
through burden-sharing compromises. In his 
words, ‘… the mechanism inducing stability is 
the propensity of democracy to moderate social 
conflict and induce compromise’ (Rodrik, 1997, 
p.1)7.  
From the point of view of political transition and 
regime choice theory, each political regime has 
different redistributive consequences because 
every individual supports the political 
arrangement that maximizes his income after tax. 
The political strategy of each individual with the 
amount and type of economic assets he controls 
is always constrained by the cost he has to bear to 
achieve his preferred outcome. (Boix 2004, p. 
10).  Those political costs are derived from either 
excluding part of the population from voting, or 
conversely, trying to overturn the restrictions 
imposed by an authoritarian regime.  
 
Following this theoretical approach, Boix (2004) 
calculates the yearly probability of democratic 
transition and democratic breakdown as a 
function of income distribution in the period 
from 1950 to 1990. The idea is as follows; a more 
unequal distribution of wealth increases the 
redistributive demands of the population and the 
ultimate level of taxes in a democratic system.  As 
the potential level of transfers become larger, the 
authoritarian inclinations of the wealthy increase 
and the probabilities of democratization decline 
steadily. Conversely, as income inequality 
declines, democracies are easier to establish. 
Table 2, simulates the annual probability of 
experiencing both democratic transitions and a 
democratic breakdown for different degrees of 
income inequality and human capital, in a sample 
of fifty countries. 
 
In particular, Table 2.A shows that with a high 
Gini index, the yearly probability of a democratic 
transition is close to 0. By contrast, for a 
relatively equal society, the annual probability of a 
democratic transition climbs to a range from 0.3 
(in a country with just one year of schooling) to 
0.25 for a nation with high levels of human 
capital. In turn, as shown in Table 2.B, the 
probability of democratic breakdown 
approximates 90 percent in highly unequal 
societies (especially with high levels of assets 
specificity) and then very sharply as equality and 
human capital becomes more spread. 
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Whether or not democratic regimes help to 
achieve higher economic growth is an interesting 
question that should be analyzed rigorously. Until 
now it has been assumed that democratic 
institutions help achieve a superior economic 
growth than their counterparts8. However, the 
empirical evidence on democracy and economic 
growth is still not conclusive9. In particular, the 
principal questioning has to be with the causal 
relationship between these two variables10. In 
other words, it is not clear if democratic regimes 
propitiate better economic performance, or if it is 
the degree of economic development that 
‘generates’ democratic regimes. Moreover, for 
purposes of this essay, this deal it is just 
mentioned for future study.  
 
4. Final remarks 
 
The work of Forbes (2000) severely criticizes 
those reports that have found a negative 
relationship between income distribution and 
economic growth.  According to the author, it is 
suggested that in the short to medium term, an 
increase in the level of income inequality has a 
significant positive effect with subsequent 
economic growth. In addition to theoretical 
problems, Forbes (2000) considers most of the 
empirical works presented in the area as being 
subject to methodological problems.  Firstly, they 
cannot be considered robust, considering that 
after the sensibility tests; the inequality coefficient 
becomes non-significant, particularly when 
regional dummies are included. Secondly, the 
problem of inequality measurement and the 
omission of variables can bias the estimation. 
Finally, and according to Forbes the main 
problem, is that these studies do not properly 
explain how changes in the level of a country’s 
inequality relates to its economic growth. 
 
However, as it was argued in later sections,  there 
A. Predicted Probability of Transition from Autoritarism to Democracy by Education and Income Inequality 
Gini  Average Years of Education 
Index 1 3 5 7 9 
70 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 
60 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.016 
50 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.02 0.037 
40 0.006 0.012 0.024 0.045 0.078 
30 0.015 0.03 0.054 0.091 0.146 
20 0.036 0.064 0.107 0.167 0.245 
 
     
B. Predicted Probability of Democratic Breakdown by Education Levels and Income Inequality 
Gini  
Index 1 3 5 7 9 
70 0.948 0.832 0.618 0.359 0.153 
60 0.905 0.742 0.495 0.25 0.09 
50 0.84 0.632 0.371 0.161 0.049 
40 0.752 0.507 0.26 0.196 0.025 
30 0.643 0.383 0.169 0.053 0.011 
20 0.52 0.27 0.101 0.026 0.005 
Average Years of Education 
TABLE 2. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF REGIME TRANSITION BY EDUCATION LEVELS AND  
INCOME INEQUALITY, 1950-90 
Source: Boix (2004). 
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exist channels through which inequality affects 
economic growth, Income inequality has a strong 
negative relationship with social and political 
instability, which in turn has a negative impact on 






1. The relationship of openness and economic growth has been subject 
to a considerable number of empirical studies. Levine and Renelt 
(1992), Edwards (1992, 1993, 1998) are among the authors to have 
developed empirical studies where the final result supports a strong 
link between openness and economic growth.  
2. These measures are the coefficient of variation (COEFVAR), 
Theil’s index (THEIL), and the Gini coefficient (GINI). In addition, 
the ratio of the share of total income earned by the poorest 40 percent 
of the population to the share of income earned by the richest 20 
percent of the population is computed.  
3. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) make the differentiation between models 
of income distribution and growth that operate through non-political 
channels from those models with political equilibrium. 
4. For further reference see Bardhan and Udry (1999). This work 
establishes that a healthier, better-educated person is capable of 
producing more, and this improved productivity is rewarded in the 
labor market. The commitment of current resources to improving and 
individual’s health or education, therefore, increases the person’s 
future productivity and income. 
5. In general, many authors do not make this distinction and just refers 
it as a fiscal policy redistribution.  
6. See Fernadez and Rodrik (1990, 1991) for a broad discussion of 
reforms implemented under authoritarian regimes. 
7. Quinn and Wolley (2001) confirm the hypothesis that democracies 
tend to propitiate less political and economic instability. They tested 
an empirical economic voting model and their results were quite 
interesting. Firstly, they found that voters severely penalized 
governments for increased economic volatility. Secondly, growth and 
volatility are positively correlated in efficient democracies. Thirdly, 
and of most importance, policies in democratic systems reflect their 
more highly developed mechanism for representing citizens’ risk 
aversion.  
8. In economic terms, democracy is defined as an institutional 
equilibrium, that is, a stable outcome that results from the strategy 
choices that different individual or parties in connection make to 
maximize their own welfare. For further references see Boix (2004) 
and Besley and Coate (1997). 
9. For example, Perotti (1994) shows no evidence that democratic 
institutions increases economic growth. In turn, other authors found 
‘indirect’ channels through which democratic regimes increases 
economic growth. See in particular Pzewroski and Limongi (1993), 
Alesina and Perotti (1993), Rodrik (1997), and Quinn and Wolley 
(2001). 
10. Foreweraker and Landman (2004) argue that there exists positive 
and linear relationship between economic development and 
democracy. This relationship suggests that those countries with high 
levels of economic development tend to be democratic, while less 
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